The article presents an analysis of modern Kazakhstani discourse, which is considered as a constructed text. Statistical data on media preferences confirm author's conclusions on the characteristic features of Kazakhstani mass consciousness, including those expressed in the medial space. In this paper, we analyze the psychological, semiotic, sociological, culturological and psycholinguistic approaches to the phenomena of the medial sphere. Within the framework of the critical discourse analysis theory, the article outlines the rhetorical strategies of social cognition and perception, expressed in mass consciousness. We also make an attempt to compare the newest cognitive studies of the language in American practice with the leading European discourse studies. On the basis of the selected correlation of cognitive theory and the theory of medial analysis, the author develops a model of analysis for conceptual space of the media discourse. The thesis of Sovietization of Kazakhstani medial space is confirmed by the analysis of samples of mass culture and rhetorical features of Kazakhstani discourse. In the work we present exclusive psycholinguistic data -associative fields to the ideological concepts of linguistic consciousness, which have a predictive nature for interdisciplinary research. The article reveals the trends and examples of official and mass discourse -the ideological "products" of our time: from the surviving Soviet cliches to the newly created national identity. The revealed features of the Kazakhstani media discourse have specific character of the manifestation of post -Soviet culture. It shows that, the return to traditional attitudes was reflected in the rhetorical strategies of communication, and is revealed by the authors of this article.
Introduction
Due to historical, geographical and, as a consequence, geopolitical reasons, Kazakhstan is still a "discursive" intersection. At present, the majority of the country's population is Kazakhs. The share of non-Kazakh elites in the country is minimal, Kazakhs are represented in all professional spheres and social strata. The population of the Republic of Kazakhstan is more than 18 million people, according to the Committee on Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan (66.48 % are Kazakhs; 20 .61 % -Russian (6.3 % of them -able to read and write in Kazakh). For the 2017 -2018 academic year the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan registered 3843 schools with Kazakh and 1508 schools with Russian language of study. Thus, Kazakhstan is a poly-ethnic post-Soviet republic, with a construction of a national state with an apparent Kazakh ethnic core. In recent years there have occurred some new ideological novelties such as "new Kazakhstani patriotism", the national idea -"Mengilik El" (Eternal Land) and some more which we attribute to ideologemes. These ideologemes are created with a claim to the projected future. At the same time, in the mass consciousness, there is a clear shift towards the values of the Soviet past. The social nature of Kazakhstani society itself was predisposed to such a shift. In its turn, the socio-political archaism could not help but Y. Aslanov, S. Dyuzhikov reflected on the language and medial space.
Modern Kazakhstani discourse (in its social, aesthetic, everyday and all other manifestations) can and should be perceived, in our opinion, as a constructed "text". Only at that rate the aesthetic, linguistic and social stereotypes of our time and place become understandable. What is the "discursive" history of Kazakhstan at the end of the 20th and in 21st centuries (from reconstruction to the middle of two thousands)? Or more precisely, the essence of what is happening in the discourse? An attempt to answer these questions (can be explained in interdisciplinary and perspective terms for further scientific development) is made in the work of V. Ibraeva on the art history of post-Soviet Kazakhstan (Ibraeva, 2014) . These include the following historical and cultural concepts: the matrix of socialism in the land of nomads; liberalization and nationalism, sovereignty in bronze, higt-tech and feudalism; criticism, ethnofuturism. These culturological formulations and fine art history terms themselves very accurately characterize and explain the tendencies and samples of Kazakhstani official and mass discourse, which are the ideological "products" of our time: from the surviving Soviet stamps to the national identity being created here and now.
Materials and methods
To do a further analysis we need to answer two more questions. A. What scientific direction can provide a methodological base for an effective analysis? B. How does language exist in the modern Kazakhstan medial space? There is still an inherited traditional practice of performing scientific linguistic research apart from political theories in Kazakhastan. O. Moroz's remark proved accurate with regard to Kazakhstan's scientific practice, "The result of this policy of silence was the practice of discursive description of Soviet social, anthropological and cultural experience with the help of "unproblematic", that is, hollow symbolic patterns" (Moroz, 2016: 69) . It should be noted that nowadays Kazakhstani sociologists, political scientists and philologists are still trying to identify the realities of the transit period, which is well studied and continues to be relevant for Western culturologists and semiotics (Kellner et al., 2015; Murašov, 2016) . Another question is why Kazakhstani scientists knowingly ignore this already established European scientific context? In most cases, Kazakh scholars' linguistic research works, regardless of the language of consideration (Kazakh, Russian, English and any other) are based exclusively on old Russian lingua -cultural studies. The exact logical assessment of such linguistic and cultural studies was given by N.N. Boldyrev as early as in 2014 "It is on this path, I think, today go numerous conceptual studies that are engaged in "searching" the concept standing behind some or other linguistic forms. Moreover, even ("complete the circle") they set the goal to find the language means of verbalization of the same concept (for the most part, we must understand the same language forms on the basis of which it was singled out)" (Boldyrev, 2014: 28) . Further in the article we draw samples of Kazakhstans' linguistic (associative) consciousness represented in the form of associative fields to 12 concepts related to ideological sphere on the material of Russian and Kazakh languages. In addition, there are used some examples of Kazakhstani mass and official media discourse in order to illustrate and confirm the thesis abstracts.
The dictionary of associative norms of any language always acts as an original and reliable source for cultural and socio-psychological research. The given work presents both traditional psycholinguistic methods obtained as a result of a free associative experiment and elements of critical discourse analysis (van Dijk, 1997) . Language and social patterns (including the contemporary aesthetic preferences) turn out to be interconnected in this case. Human experience, represented through associative dictionary, gives real images that should be regarded as facts from which we can proceed.
Discussion
In our opinion, in this case we are still dealing with the masked coexistence of linguistic theory and political concepts. Practically, many Kazakhstani linguists tend to wish to find commonalities of Kazakh and Russian culture, necessarily opposing it to Western values. They became a common place for reasoning, for example, "The analysis of the presidential oath texts in the cultures of Kazakhstan, Russia and the USA shows a greater conceptual similarity in Kazakh and Russian cultures and a special difference between their oaths and the American oath. Another position of the concept "people" in Kazakh and Russian culture testifies to the special attitude of the country's leadership to such concepts as human rights and freedoms, the duties of the President" (Alimzhanova, 2010: 152) . Other psycholinguistic works held on the material of Kazakh language and using dated scientific approaches in the spirit of 18 th century, compile various lists of words, that, according to their compilers, reflect significant for Kazakh culture concepts such as person, woman, man, word, language, etc. (Ahmetzhanova, 2012) . But at the same time there is a sophistical substitution: the most of characteristic features of modern Kazakh culture are determined exclusively from folklore sources, classical literary texts, paremias, phraseological units and so on. Strictly speaking, these selected sources are self-presentational and only record how the ethnos would like to see itself, but not real facts about it. The analysis of discourse in its various manifestations presupposes different approaches, among which we find psychological, semiotic, sociological, culturological, and psycholinguistic.
Mediality theory (McLuhan, 2017) and the theory of cultural anthropology of our time (Bachmann, Medic, 2017) , in our view, can overcome the current crisis in the humanitarian fields of Kazakhstani science. Let us explain that text (and, accordingly, the material of scientific reflection) is everything not only traditionally published and literary examples, but also theater, cinema and performances, the list is endless. In the modern humanitarian paradigm, the concept of the native speaker's cognitive state is important, and we cannot consider any models of knowledge representation beyond it. Umberto Eco reasonably calls this field ideology, "By ideology we will understand everything that the addressee is somehow familiar with and the social group to which he belongs, the system of his psychological expectations, all his intellectual skills, life experience, moral principles (Eco, 1998: 108) .
Initially, it should also be noted: "In fact, it should be emphasized that it is not language, but discourse, that is, a special order -different from the substance of language in the sense in which the linguists define the concept of language, but which is realized in language" (Kurtin, 1999: 96) . Finally, the models of situations themselves are necessary for us as the basis for interpreting the text.
As the author of the original discourse theory and methodology of critical discourse analysis notes, "The most important component of the processes of constructing and perceiving texts is the comprehension of social situations behind them and their cognitive representation" (van Dijk, 2000: 16) . The following hierarchical sequence is constructed: the fundamental one is the derivative of the theory. Let us explain that the study of the phenomena of thinking and language as special realities with all their specific features cannot be conducted within the framework of the traditional "pure" science, be it psychology or linguistics.
At the same time, in any field of scientific knowledge, it is assumed that both the fundamental theory dealing with the most abstract ideal object and the "second-order" theory, working with derivatives of ideal objects. In this paper, such a fundamental theory is cognitive theory of modern American cognitive research (Fauconnier, 2001; Langacker, 1992) , and its speech-producing activity is the theory of medial analysis within the general framework of critical discourse studies (van Dijk, 1997; Wodak, 2015) .
Cognitive theory and the theory of medial analysis consistently address and differentiate the areas of the three "worlds": reality, which exists objectively; the state of consciousness and its objective content; the world of objective content of thinking, considered as an actual given and developing "potentiality." The most important in the current European (British and Greek) critical discourse studies is a detailed discourse-historical analysis of the right-wing populists' rhetoric (Wodak, 2015) . So, R. Wodak explains what attracts the audience to such politicians. She gives an analysis of the linguistic methods used in the programs of political parties and media activities. Ruth Vodak is one of the few who honestly states that such parties and politicians have developed discursive and rhetorical strategies that make false statements sound innocent, allow one to deny the obvious, overstep the bounds of what is permitted, etc. As an example, we can take a strategy of well-considered ambiguity. Let us illustrate a possible scenario, firstly some actions (for example, an anti-Semitic caricature) provoke a scandal, then after the protests are gone, the provocation is denied, eventually the scandal is redefined and the provocateur acts as a victim. True is the fact that for the post-Soviet ideological space this is very familiar. The phenomenon of right-wing populism is given in a single link with the successful construction of fear in Western society. Besides, we could mention historical revisionism, which fits well into the current European myths.
Another block is an analysis of the discourse on nationalism. The key statement of R. Wodak is that we are witnessing the normalization of the rhetoric of isolation. As supporting examples from the medial practice of the UK, Switzerland and Germany. Wodak describes bus posters calling for "illegal immigrants" to leave the country, political speeches, language control policies. It is productive for further research to review the behavior of populist leaders and politicians in social and traditional media, whether it might be Facebook, comic books or "behind-the-scenes" speeches. A key concept introduced for modern mass media studies is "authenticity", that is to say, what means to be "true" ("A true American" in R. Wodak's work), yet we can correlate this with our realities. In any case, the analysis of the medial space in a particular country under consideration is impossible outside of the notation, at least in general terms, of the conceptual space and national values that are in interdependence with everything named.
With a high degree of certainty we admit that today's Kazakhstani media realms could be defined as mixed up. The newly-familiar Soviet simulativeness and its new Kazakh incarnation, in which the signifiers are as far from reality as the former Soviet-internationalist ones. In particular, the situation in the Kazakhstani media discourse with the return to the traditional mass mentality resembles the socialist mass communication of the 1930s. But this is replaced by something new. In any situation, an outwardly oriented person who has been formed in our society, creates, and consumes media products. To date, one can assume the effective and not always positive influence of post-soviet mythological reconstructions concerning the recent past on the consciousness of the emerging Kazakh society.
Results
To a large extent, the statistics of language preferences in the medial sphere confirms the thesis about the coincidence of the linguistic consciousness of these two Kazakhstani groups. In 2003 B.B. Abdygaliev pointed out that the overwhelming majority of the population watched television programs only in Russian (32.9 %), or, in most cases, only in Russian (23.9 %), as much as in Russian, and in Kazakh 26.4 % of respondents (Abdygaliev, 2003: 94) . Kazakh language mass medis as the main channel for obtaining information in 2003 was used by 3.4-8.0 % of the population (Abdygaliev, 2003: 94) . The situation has not changed in ten years (there is simply no more relevant data). So, the answers to the question of language preference in watching TV programs, reading books and browsing the Internet can be presented as the following table 1 (Nurayalieva, Fazilzhanova, 2013: 2) (224 respondents were interviewed). Conditions of public and mass consciousness were traditionally recorded by sociologists and culturologists. There is a scientific branch that could practically interfere in this conversation named psycholinguistics. The dictionary of associative norms of any language always acts as an original and reliable source for cultural and socio-psychological research. The work of psycholinguist N.V. Dmitruk is of the greatest value in Kazakhstan's research practice (Dmitriuk, Moldagaliyeva, 2014; Dmitriuk 2016; Dmitriuk, Cherkasova, 2016) . We will give only one indicative example: the high degree of Russian vocabulary presence in the linguistic consciousness of modern Kazakhs is confirmed by the following parameter: among the reaction-associations, a total of 2113 527 russisms are used: 403 by men and 124 by women (Dmitriuk, 2016: 34) .
The thesis about the archaization (sovietization) of Kazakhstan's mass culture may require to be clarified at the point that the archaization of consciousness is not a return to the old, but the restoration of the past based on the knowledge and ideas that are popular nowadays. It is revealed when referring to samples of mass consciousness reflected in associative fields. Below we demonstrate high-frequency zones of associative fields to concepts: power, society, personality, tradition, religion, culture. Psycholinguistic experiment was conducted in 2017 -2018. According to the traditional method of free associative experiment, the informants were respectively Russian-speaking and Kazakh-speaking residents of Almaty with higher education, gender ratio -58% of women, 42% of men (on average 100 -120 informants aged 25 to 58 years, the frequency of the reaction in the associative field is indicated next to the word-reaction). Following N.V. Dmitruk (Dmitriuk, Moldagaliyeva, 2014) we consider it advisable to translate into Russian the reactions to the incentive words of Kazakh language (orthography and punctuation of informants are preserved). These incentive words are not fixed in other Kazakh associative dictionaries and sources. The associative fields themselves are published for the first time. The authors suggest their informative value for further discursive studies.
Power -power (16), president (14), government (11), money (7), people (7), politics (6), state (6), money (5), corruption (5), Nazarbayev (5), the manual (5) (Russian speaking residents).
Power -(government) (20), politic (16), head of the government (15), management (13) carrier (9), power (8), dominion (5) (Kazakh-speaking residents).
Individual -person (38), individuality (7), individual (5), citizen (5) (Russian speaking residents).
Individual -human being (26), I (25), genius (12), individual (8), leader (8), citizen (5) (Kazakh-speaking residents). Society -people (22), public (16), society (12), government (5), opinion (5), society (5) (Russian speaking residents).
Society -people (21), environment (16), people (21), country (12), freedom (9), society (7) (Kazakh-speaking residents).
Tradition -custom (17), culture (12), family (11), people (8), national (7), rituals (5). (Russian speaking residents).
Tradition) -national tradition (21), holidays (16), customs (9), songs, melodies (9), rules (7) (Kazakh-speaking residents).
Religion -faith (26), Islam (15), god (7), Christianity (6), mosque (5), atheism (5) (Russian speaking residents).
Religion -Islam(29), Muslim(18), mosque (12), the religion of each nation (10), (religion(8), religious viewpoints (5) ( Kazakh-speaking residents).
Culture -upbringing (7), behavior (6), history (5), heritage (5) (Russian speaking residents). Culture -art (25), upbringing (17), customs (12), culture (8), society (7), ethics (6) ( Kazakhspeaking residents).
Despite the certain logic of the Kazakh "option" of the associative field, the word in this version does not express the complete attribute of the state of things; there is no "ideal" event. They first of all recorded "crowd's thinking" -stereotyped and repetitive images. Words-reactions in most cases are "literary-centric", they completely follow from the journalistic discourse. Despite the fact that incentive words refer to the ideological sphere, the reactions in the Kazakh and Russian linguistic consciousness have ethnic and emotional components. The words-simulacra in this case simultaneously reflect the fundamental reality entirely in the spirit of the ideas of J. Baudrillard (Baudrillard, 2016); they also mask and distort reality itself. Kazakhstan's sociologists proposed an explanatory notion of "petty bourgeoisie" as a unifying socio-cultural community of modern Kazakhstan. This is the special ideology in which Soviet ideologems, including the most obvious ones like dogmatism and superficial thinking are preserved. In the interpretation of G. Ileuova, sociologist, there we see so called "philistines" acting as an emerging basic social stratum. The term itself does not bear any negative assessment (Ileuova, 2015) . As an example, let us consider the "comprehension" of well-known events in one of the social networks. We are talking about an interview with a girl (shot on camera), who said that "The December events in 1986 happened because General Kuropatkin, who ruled here, arranged a formal famine: he sent all the products to Russian provinces, thereby local youth rebelled and organized an insurrection. It lasted three weeks or three months. This uprising was headed, it seems, by the poet Shakhanov ... (everything in the text is mixed: the 19th and 20th centuries, the incompatible Soviet and Russian historical realities, but the ideal mass and at the same time petty-bourgeois stereotypes of perception, that are remote from historical realities and elementary logic are shown,). Under this designation -"petty bourgeoisie" -is meant and everyday traditionalism in the evaluation of all and everything, a near-zero level of creative and critical comprehension of oneself and society and other social manifestations. Perhaps, the most computable is that the Kazakhstani (in this case, both Russianlanguage and Kazakh) mass language consciousness has no "myths"; in fact, there are no ideological and culturological stereotypes.
First of all, the language practice of Kazakhstan's discourse shows the processes of language impoverishment and standardization. Language ceases to be a phenomenon of culture and acts only as a means of recording and transmitting information. Furthermore, the political scientists and culturologists unambiguously agree about the fact of "Sovietization" of Kazakhstan's mass consciousness, or at least they point at an obvious tilt towards the values of the Soviet past. Before our eyes, post-Sovietism is becoming the meaning and symbol of the current Kazakhstan's government. On the other hand, the ideological content of Kazakhstan's realities by Soviet content and assessment is inevitable. For the sole reason which is stressed by Kazakhstani political scientists: "Within the state itself, there is still no single cultural and even mental space that could form common national values" (Satpaev et al, 2014: 34) . The social nature of Kazakhstani society itself was predisposed to such a turn. One of the indicated explanations for a return to sociopolitical archaism, also evidently present in the Russian mass consciousness is Kazakhstanis' media preferences. Furthermore, the modern mass media are particularly intensely focused on the emotional, affective side of a person.
Today, Kazakhstanis (Kazakhs and Russian-speaking residents) perceive the world through the prism of Russian ideology, which is clearly nostalgic for the Soviet past. And here raises an inevitable question: what fills up Kazakhstan's medial space? There are Kazakh and Russian ethos's and, accordingly, Kazakh and Russian-language discourses. The symbolic confrontation between them either open or (sometimes) hidden is clearly present. How should we take the latter? Nowadays the interaction between Kazakh and Russian cultures in the country is more like a random mix, than organic integration. Traditionally and most likely, it is fairly believed that the population of Kazakhstan is sufficiently "immersed" in Soviet ideology. It is obvious that the Russification policy of non-Russian people in the Soviet years led to the Russian identity in the Kazakhs (through Russian language, history, literature, music, films, etc.).
Not so much the Russian language, but the Soviet identity unites our two countries. Precisely this identity is, sometimes even unconsciously, asserted by both politicians and humanists of Soviet and post-Soviet orientation. It is also supported by Russian media and camouflaged is image called "common information space". Besides, even forgotten clichés of Soviet communication have returned to everyday speech practice: "Take a taxi if you do not like the bus. You can be sacked, there are always people for your place." In this case, we can and should assume that we are also involved in this process, where "the media are not only neutral means of transmitting information; their capacity to transform, their performative, expressive and symbolic possibilities, their specific forms of manifestation, they themselves participate in the process of revealing the sense. Moreover, the modern mass media are particularly intensively appealing to the emotional, affective side of a person, thus participating in the restructuring of the perceptual and cognitive structure, "so does the German researcher predict the place of the media in the modern world (Gunter, 2006: 5) .
Ideological secondariness and national myth-making are the defining features of the actual Kazakhstan's media discourse. The division of Kazakhstani society into two information spaces (Kazakh-speaking and Russian-speaking) can be adopted with the following clarifications. By this time, the Russian Diaspora has ceased to influence the cultural process as an independent force. In due time (the Soviet period), two languages performed different functions in society, served different social and ethnic groups. For a long time, Russian language was also a mechanism for communication, and a means of exchanging information, a progressive language of culture, politics and power. Two spaces carried different values, different symbols and different models of behavior to the society. Russian culture in Kazakhstan has ceased to be fundamental, and Kazakh on the contrary became mass. What is now the Russian style in Kazakhstan? This is a false pathos, impersonality and mediocrity of the author's expression. In the modern Kazakhstani media discourse, in relation to all of its concrete manifestations, anthropocentrism of interpretation as a cognitive model is the most obvious. The general tendency of modern Kazakhstan's traditional and new media is the predominance of actual journalism over analytical materials. At the same time, the manipulation of Russian and Kazakh journalism of our time has become more aggressive. Perhaps, therefore, rhetorical principles and methods of manipulating the mass audience (advertising texts, propaganda companies, etc.) with suggestive principles of speech therapy are observed recently in Kazakhstan's mass culture, as well as in Russian practice of the last fiveseven years.
These include, first, the simplification of meaning; thus, mass media consumers (whether it is a person or a mass of people) do not have to make complex mental efforts anymore. With respect to the public speech behavior the meaning in Kazakhstan is simplified. Likewise in the Soviet years, there is nothing indefinite, vague or unsaid in modern Kazakhstani discourse, on the contrary, only those speech phrases, where everything is right, can exist. At a simple level, this leads to the fact that a meeting with a city the mayor (akim) and a regional conference of a party members, described in mass media, highly resemble each other in form and style. Currently we see a second "coming" of the officialese in Kazakhstani publicistic discourse. It is present both on the republican television screen, in state "promises" and in local social advertising, as well as in Kazakhstan newspaper and journalistic publicism. In all these cases there is no "ideal" event, but there are only massive, repetitive images. This is, in most cases, the modern language of Kazakhstani publicism and television. Again, as in the 30s of the twentieth century, big words, which are a verbal imitation of rough activity (optimization, formatting, etc) are in favor. From the same series appears to be the creation of new slogans like "One Hundred Schools -One Hundred Hospitals", "Salamat Kazakhstan", "Employment Road Map -2020", "Business Road Map 2020", "Informational Kazakhstan". Although there have occurred many abbreviations with similar names, for instance, NPP, GFSS, ENPF, Damu, SPC, the organizations standing behind them are parasitizing on business. They are organizations with intermediary services and no more.
The latest examples, addressed to the population by the state, are: "youth personnel reserve", "culture factor in the crisis epoch", "breakthrough projects", "programs for developing the potential of youth", etc. "But there were those who were against the line of the party because they tried to defend common sense -those for whom the pain of the people was not an empty abstraction, it passed through their heart, it made their conscience bleed," -so modern author-journalist writes about party figures of the Soviet era (written by a famous journalist these days). There also a phenomenon in the official media discourse, the origin of which lays in cognitive sphere, the phenomenon is known as "reasoning" in pathopsychology. The characteristics of this phenomenon include weakness of judgments, circumlocution, pretentious-evaluative position, meaningfulness, necessarily accompanied by speech illiteracy. Of course, with a certain assumption, the above examples can be only ranked as the speech errors of their authors. But the overwhelming majority of scientific and publicistic texts with an inevitable regularity will differ by their reasoning, officialese and simulative anthropocentrism of interpretation. The language and general social patterns of thought (including the aesthetic predilections of the age) are, in this case, interconnected. In the Kazakh media discourse, there is an evaluation model "I'm good, you're bad," an archaic desire to discredit someone, identical to the contemporary Russian public discourse. Group-centrism and mythopoetry are the most obvious qualities of the clearly identified and objectively present in the modern discourse of Kazakhstan. This was once written by Kazakhstani historian N. Masanov, who mentioned that "One of the system characteristics of the structure of such social consciousness is group-centrism with its various projections (ethnocentrism, confessional, regional, class-clan egoism, patriarchal-genealogical narcissism, etc.). Group-centric consciousness is already naturally biased, it is only receptive to complementarily about "its moral community" (groups), yet it is always aggressive towards any, even fair, but critical assessments " (Masanov, 2007: 7) .
Conclusion
The Kazakhstani medial space reflects not only traditional consciousness (primitive-group ideology) but also Soviet experience. It is for this reason that the historical materials, articles about batyrs, akyns and national traditions prevail in the Kazakh-language press. Nevertheless, it is not possible to designate this historical mythology as the symbolic reconstruction of collective memory. Although there are obvious attempts of identification through ethno-religious solidarity. From the same series comes the penetration of mythological stereotypes of perception of historical reality into the educational process (modern Kazakhstan textbooks on history and literature). Why did the Soviet community take roots in Kazakhstan? It blends well with the value-normative orientation toward the group, the collective principle which states that, "one of the most important conditions for the implementation of this orientation was conformism" (Abylkhozhin, 2007: 17) .
We see an attempt to "work" (as well as to manipulate) with traditional values, undoubted submission to authority, the primacy of group values through historical narrative. In the same series, we see the declared conformism (perception of oneself as a particle of the whole and complete submission to it), the ideology of solidarity and the conservative tendency of the Kazakh media discourse. Actually, the national publicism of Kazakhstan has always been marked by an emphatically subjective assessment of all and everything throughout the twenty years of its existence. Any world events are primarily evaluated with caution -and what do they represent for Kazakhstan. Perhaps the last manifestation can be referred to the outlays of the emerging national consciousness. It is curious that this cultivated isolationism after the well-known Ukrainian events became peculiar to Kazakhstan's journalism of recent years. Kazakh-language press differs from Russian-language press in thematic filling, but not in ideological comprehension of socioeconomic and socio-political reality. In the Kazakh press, according to A. Baigozhina: "Events are described as self-sufficient phenomena, as a regular case of culture -outside the dynamics of a changing world, in which these events actually take place" (Baygozhina,2000:36) .
The Kazakh press is mythologized, and the reader himself, generally, is exalted by the tone of treatment towards him (similar effect exists in Kazakh oratorical art), and the reader always understands his high mission. Kazakh culture became household and grounded. Cross-cutting themes -the state of the Kazakh language, speculations, interviews, tolgau are the favorite genre of the Kazakh press. Nomadic mentality manifests in the space of reasoning and their abstractness. Schematically, the functional distinction between the Kazakh and Russian-language media discourse can be presented as follows.
Kazakh press: function -enlightenment; rhetoricalnessof the form; interest in the personality; monologism of the author's expression.
Russian-language press: function of the organization; literary orientation; interest in the event; use of dialogical forms.
There is a propagandist intercourse formed before our eyes, which is a socially-oriented communication, addressed not to a single interlocutor, but to the generalized image of audience. In political and publicistic discourse revives the possibly forgotten Soviet stylistics of conversational style, "reduced" vocabulary, direct appeals to the audience, "joint" with the audience judgments and assessments, only formally close to alive interpersonal communication. Language is connected with the comprehension of reality. On the basic premise Kazakhstan's speech samples lack the dialogue. Kazakhstan's medial space reflects the real speech and social situations of our time. Everything is mixed up and very mosaic: from archaic and Soviet stereotypes to modern postmodern models. But exactly these modern communications, as some "cultural cans" precisely grasp and reflect our time.
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